GOOD MORNING FROM LONDON

21 MARCH 2026. CHINA POST #616

CHINA AND THE FOREIGN MEDIA

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CHINA AND RACISM

In this issue of Good Morning from London China Post #616 the focus is on the assertion that China is dictatorial, and racist in its dealings with its National Minorities.

There are two reasons why this is a topical; first, because the critical media will often cite China’s actions in Tibet and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China as oppressive and discriminatory and, second, because a new law was introduced at the recent meeting of the National People’s Congress that focuses on ethnic unity. In summary the thrust of The Economist article – reproduced below – is that the new law is fresh evidence of the authoritarian and repressive nature of the rule of Xi Jinping. It is anti-democratic and – in relation to the 56 national minorities – unwaveringly racist.

Following the Xi-Trump meeting in Seoul, Soth Korea in October 2025, The Economist, has changed the tone of its coverage of China and – where China’s economic policy is concerned – the journal has written positively about the manner in which Xi Jinping handled President Trump in Seoul. In the opinion of The Economist, Seoul October 2025 was a turning point in world affairs with China and President Xi landing a significant blow on President Trump over Tariffs and Rare Earths. This has led the journal to show considerably more respect for China’s conduct of its economy and its growing influence in the geo-political struggle with the U.S.

The Economist has woken up. It had been sleepwalking through the history of China since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the introduction by Deng Hsiaoping of his Reform Policy in 1979 and China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2002. It has taken a long time for the scales to fall from the eyes of the Editor of The Economist – but fallen they have and the publication’s articles on China are showing a greater respect for China, its leadership and its role in world affairs.

But there are limitations. The Economist remains a publication fundamentally opposed to the Communist experiment that is at the heart of China’s development. The journal is strongly committed to the Capitalist system and also to Western political democracy. It has no time for authoritarian systems that reject – as China does –  the Western Parliamentary system of the rule of law, the separation of powers and OMOV (One Man One Vote).

The issue of racism is the final anti-China argument when all else fails. If China is racist – so the argument goes – it cannot claim a leading role on behalf of the developing third world. The racist argument attempts to drive a wedge between China and the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin-America at the very time that China’s Belt and Road Initiative – the construction of ports, highways, power installations and infrastructure development generally – is making such progress with 150+ countries signed up to China’s unique economic growth policy for world development

In the eyes of the developed world China’s credentials to be a world leader must be undermined. China must be discredited. Socialism cannot be seen to triumph over Capitalism. Hence the significance of the repeated allegation that China is racist in its dealings with its 56 national minorities. If China pursues a racist policy within its own boundaries – so the anti-China argument goes – it cannot lead the developing world in its struggle against the imperialist domination of the U.S. and the Group of Ten countries.

It is in this context that The Economist’s article is of such importance. So the article is reproduced in full. It is followed by my Comments.

THE ECONOMIST

“CHINA’S PARLIAMENT is not known for its debates. Meeting for roughly ten days every March, it exists to approve, not to question. But what it lacks in disagreement, it makes up for in colourful dress. The Great Hall of the People, where it convenes, becomes a parade of elaborate costumes. On March 5th, its opening day, Chaguan first spotted a man in a black cape with fiery swirls across his shoulder. Next, a woman in a jangly silver crown twice as large as any worn by King Charles. Then more and more: flowing garments, dense embroidery, splashes of dark red, bright pink, deep blue.

They are the minority—literally. China, in the official telling, is composed of 56 separate ethnicities. Parliamentary representatives who are Han, the dominant ethnic group, generally attend in grey and black business attire. But many delegates drawn from the other 55 ethnicities stand out. Yang Lianying, a Miao woman, was beaming in a floral headdress. “It is not convenient for my normal work,” said Ms Yang, who usually serves as a doctor in the south-western province of Yunnan. “During the parliament, I wear it every day.”

As it turns out, the pageantry will come to a dreary intersection with the actual proceedings of the parliament. A new law headed for a vote will formalise a sweeping project to erase much of what remains of ethnic distinctiveness in China. Based on precedent, more than 95% of delegates, including the minority members themselves, will dutifully back it. It is a grim milestone in the party’s harder-line approach to ethnic politics, born of fear that the bigger minority groups were proving too hard to control.

In the 1950s China accorded its minorities—about 9% of the population—a range of privileges. “56 flowers, 56 ethnic groups”, as a popular song once put it. Although official propaganda often portrayed minorities as exotic mascots, they were given a degree of latitude that can seem positively liberal by today’s standards. They could travel fairly freely, follow many of their religious precepts and educate children in their own languages. The hope was that this would foster development and loyalty. Over the decades, though, outbursts of violence and protest in Tibet, Xinjiang and, to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia persuaded the party that even relative autonomy had failed.

China started to move in the opposite direction in the late 2000s. Under Xi Jinping, the process has dramatically accelerated. He has pushed harder and faster than his predecessors, willing to launch whatever crackdowns he believes are needed to shore up party rule. The result has been a wrenching and sometimes deadly process. Instead of emphasising differences between groups, the party now speaks of them as together forming the “community of the Chinese nation”. Textbooks devote less content to the 56 separate groups. And when Mr Xi talks of them, it is about their unity.

That might sound warm and inclusive. But in practice the shift has looked more like aggressive assimilation than enlightened tolerance. In Tibet authorities have arrested monks, taken control of monasteries, packed young children off to boarding schools and forced locals to denounce the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang rights groups have documented the arbitrary detention of more than a million Muslims in a mass re-education campaign, while mosques have been destroyed. In Inner Mongolia officials have crushed protests against making Mandarin the main language of education.

When passed by this year’s parliament, the “law on promoting ethnic unity and progress” will codify many of these changes. Among its provisions, it requires Mandarin to have prominence over minority languages in schools and in official communication; it calls for “new social customs”, including barring anyone from blocking marriages on identity grounds; and it mandates that different ethnicities should live in mixed communities. The law also provides a new legal basis for prosecuting anyone who opposes the party’s definition of ethnic harmony, including parents who instill “detrimental” views in their children.

All for one

Uncomfortably for critics in the West, there are some parallels between China’s approach to minorities and those of other countries. For people who say its Mandarin-first policies are discriminatory, look at France, where schools have long placed limits on regional languages such as Basque and Corsican. The end of affirmative action in America’s university admissions has an analogue in the growing number of Chinese provinces that have stopped awarding extra points to minority students on the gaokao university-entrance exam. And Denmark’s “anti-ghetto” law aims to resettle minorities in more mixed communities. In any “what-about” contest, China’s defenders already have their ammunition.

But in the real world, away from the scorched earth of social media, there is a real policy question, albeit not one that China’s parliament is debating. Will the smothering and suppression of minority languages, religions and customs actually get the party what it wants? Could China have found a durable solution to the challenge of governing a multi-ethnic state by granting greater autonomy to its minority groups, rather than giving them less and less space? China never seriously considered such a relaxation, which would have cut against Mr Xi’s instinct for ever-tighter control.

In the party’s view, suppression is the path to national unity, stability and prosperity. What is not known—and may not be known for decades—is whether it is also storing up resentments that may eventually erupt. For now the direction is all too clear. The party embraces its minorities in the most superficial sense imaginable: it likes their singing, their dancing and, of course, their dress. Beyond that, deeper displays of ethnic identity are not just frowned upon but proscribed by law.

At the parliament, the minority delegates had got the message. Leaving on specifically helpful for Mongolians. “I haven’t,” she said, before quickly adding, “but forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation is the guiding thread, and that’s good for all minorities.”

GRAHAM PERRY COMMENTS;-

1. THE OPENING SENTENCE

“CHINA’S PARLIAMENT… exists to approve, not to question”. The first few words of the article encapsulate a fundamental flaw in the approach of The Economist to China. A throwaway line designed to suggest that the NPC is little more than a chamber to rubber stamp the decisions of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. No discussions. No debate. No freedom. The West – and the Economist leads on this point – are determined to fit China into the traditional analysis of a totalitarian political structure. The argument runs like this – Beijing Decides; The Party Implements; The People follow.

The population, so the argument goes, of 1.4bn is subservient, compliant and unquestioning. There is no freedom. It is George Orwell’s 1984 This is the narrative at the heart of the Western approach to China – the Party instructs the People. The People are compliant They always fall into line.

The reality is quite different. China is a meritocracy where competition for the leading positions in the Party and in the Government is based on results. The best reach the top. They are tested and those that bring success move up the structure. They are promoted. Achievement is rewarded. They start at a low level of responsibility in the villages and towns and, if successful, move up to the counties and the cities and eventually to provincial and central government.

What is success? Personal Advancement? No. This is not about Ego and Self and individual achievement. It is about doing a good job for the People. It sounds like a cliché – something from the Western manual of Business School and there are parallels – but there is one enormous difference between the mind set of the successful government employee in China and in the UK. It is this –  in China service has to come before self. Patriotism, Serving the People, Achieving for the Nation’s Benefit. This is the China Model. Corruption – the #1 Enemy of the Party – is Self before Society and remains a problem in China. It will go – eventually but not for at least four generations and during that time the intense focus of the Party is to continue to bring to the fore leaders who are talented, capable with an awareness that doing a good job for the country is the #1 goal.  

The turnaround in China has taken many commentators by total surprise – from textiles, shoes and cameras in the 1980s  to solar panels, artificial intelligence and wind turbines of 2026. The speed and breadth of China’s changes since 1979 is explicable only through an understanding of the meritocratic leadership of the Party and the wholehearted participation of the people at local and Provincial level.

There is a another point – nothing is reported in the Western media on the work of the NPC between the public gatherings of appointed representatives. No information is provided on the structure of government or the process of decision making or on contentious development decisions Such information is available at a national and provincial level and it is part of the process of government. But The Economist’s reporting is silent on such matters. And there is a reason – unless a country adopts the Westminster system of Government it must be autocratic, dictatorial and oppressive. This thinking is fundamentally flawed. China is different but many Westerners are reluctant to embrace the difference.

2. THE DRESS CODE

Again notice the condescending tone adopted in relation to the dress of the National Minority delegates. They are colourful and representative of the traditions of their local customs. Shouldn’t the Western media – Instead of ridiculing them (see the reference to King Charles’s silver crown) –  be pleased that the 56 national minority delegates are celebrating their local traditions in such a public forum. On the one hand we are being told that the Party hierarchy are doing everything to diminish and remove local traditions and yet at the heart of the nation – the Great Hall of the People in Beijing – the delegates of the National Minorities are displaying in front of the media – China’s media and the world’s too – their local styles, traditions and customs.

3. HOW TO RECONCILE THE CENTRE WITH THE LOCAL.

A pause in the narrative to reflect on a significant outcome of China’s wide ranging detailed analysis of the decline and fall of the USSR because it is so relevant to the policies of China today. In the early 1990’s China engaged in a massive undertaking to ascertain why the Soviet Union foundered and eventually fell apart. Study groups, universities, think tanks and research institutes across China were required to investigate and analyse the decline and fall of the USSR in every aspect of its work – politics, culture, education, sport et al. Nothing was omitted. China wanted to know what had gone wrong. Not as an academic exercise but as a tool of analysis in order to prevent inbuilt weaknesses from taking root in China.

Two conclusions were reached about the decline and fall of the USSR that formed the heart of China’s approach to building Socialism in China with Chinese characteristics;-

3.1   Maintain the Leading Role of the Party.

In the USSR, the Communist Party had surrendered its leading role to key interest groups – the Oligarchs and the Military Chiefs in particular. The lesson for the Communist Party in China was that it must lead and not follow. The Party had to be in control. A vote in favour of a Strong Centre.

• Distribute Economic Decision-Making to the Provinces.

This was a big surprise. A big vote in favour of more Localism, More grass roots initiative. More power to the Provinces. The USSR was top-heavy. Moscow decided everything. Commands were issued by the Centre and obeyed by the Local. And it failed. China must not make the same mistake. Changes were made. Power was distributed. Decision-making was diversified. Local initiative was given its head. People on the ground (in the cities, the counties and the villages) were encouraged to be active, involved and imaginative.

It makes sense. Commands from the Centre in relation to each and every economic and social policy in the Provinces would get lost in translation. The initiative lay with the Province and was to be passed on to the City, the County and the Village. The grass roots and not Beijing became the centre of development for the local economy. The National Plan was still of major importance and the blueprint for development but the Centre was not heavy-handed and dictatorial with the Provinces (Cities, Counties and Villages). The Centre looked to the Local for Initiative and Imagination. The Local looked to the Centre for the Plan and the Funds. A process of constant discussion, review, amendment and adjustment was underway. It had vitality and excitement and it touched the nerve centre of popular participation. Sometimes the process entrusted excessive responsibility to the Local and sometimes the responsibility was limited. Inevitably mistakes were made and corrections followed but the thrust of the new approach was in harmony with the overall goal of accelerating development of the economy and the well-being of the people.

4. DECENTRALISATION WORKS

This is an important point that arises from the changes introduced by Dang’s Reform policy. The thrust of the new approach was to distribute the decision making process away from the Centre and towards the Local and this being the case it is fundamentally at odds with The Economists conclusion that “relative autonomy had failed.”. One figure will suffice. The annual growth rate of the economy has remained at 5%. There is no evidence that the growth is patchy with setbacks in one Province compensated by surges in another. It is the case that coastal provinces with their greater access to sea ports and international trade will grow at a faster rate than the inland provinces or those located in Western China but that apart China, notwithstanding its failings in the under-performing property sector, has maintained an across-the-board consistent level of growth under the new policy of accelerating the responsibility for local development to the local authorities. Local autonomy has been at the heart of China’s progress and the policy has been accelerated and not arrested.

A word of caution. Local Autonomy does not mean that the Centre does not matter. The Centre remains the nerve centre of the Chinese experiment and the Party remains in control. But the Party recognises that progress comes from the creative thinking, imagination and experiment of the grass roots.  China recognises this. The West does not recognise this.

5. AGGRESSIVE ASSIMILATION OR ENLIGHTENED TOLERANCE?

This is where The Economist loses its way. It suggests that Xi Jinping changed direction – turning away from localism and  decentralisation and back towards centralism and Party authority. This is incorrect. The framing of the issue is flawed.

The Party remains at the apex of power. That has never changed. Gorbachev threw in the white towel when he could not deliver Guns and Butter to the people of the USSR and the Soviet Party withered away. By comparison, Xi embraced Deng’s Reforms, strengthened the Party and delivered annual economic growth of 5% and overseas holidays for millions of Chinese citizens.

China has not turned its back on local initiative and provincial power. The opposite is the case. China has elevated local initiative and provincial power. It has liberated the Provinces and encouraged them to look to local talent and ability as the basis for progress and development. China’s economic surge is the bottom up not the top down.

And this being the new norm, it goes against the grain to suggest that where the national minorities are concerned there has been a revival of centralisation at the expense of localism. China is proud of their national minorities and uses the National People’s Congress to publicise and exalt local identity but a line is to be drawn between upholding and encouraging local traditions on the one hand and promoting the identity of the national minority for the purpose of creating a separate independent state. Such activity is not Localism but Separatism. And that is the story of Tibet and Xingang and the Uighurs. Local traditions were used to enhance moves to take the two regions out of the People’s Republic of China and that will not be permitted by China.

There was hostilities in the two regions but not in the other 54 National Minorities. The aim of the Dalai Lama supported by India, the U.S. and other Western institutions was to turn Tibet into an independent breakaway state. In the same way the aim of the East Turkestan Independence Movement was to turn Xinjiang into an independent breakaway state. In both locations the issue was secession and not racism. Both moves to independence failed. There was violence – Uighur extremists perpetrated attacks on Beijing citizens in the centre of Beijing. The Chinese military responded. There was violence. There were deaths. Ringleaders were arrested and some were executed. China will protect and enhance status and identity of its National Minorities but it will discourage and be intolerant of any moves to use national identity to create independent states and, thereby, undermine the integrity of the country of China as a whole.

But are not local languages being eliminated? No. Local language is upheld and it is taught in the schools but so is Mandarin but not for the purpose of swamping the local traditions and customs. The national minority can only thrive and have natural intercourse with the people in the rest of China if they speak the language used by the people of China – Mandarin. The people of Xinjiang, if they are to prosper, need to visit the many other centres of population in China in order to promote their products and engage in trade and business – their task is made easier if they speak Mandarin. British companies promoting sales in France will ensure their staff speak French. It’s common sense. The future of the National Minorities of China depends on “Reaching Out Not Turning In”. Mandarin is promoted not to suppress local traditions or identity but to enable the national minorities to engage in social and economic intercourse and to promote the sales of their products across the length and breadth of China.

A word about the monasteries. They are not being closed, Religion is not forbidden as evidenced by the growing ties between the Vatican in Rome and the head of the Catholic Church in Bejing. Pope Francis, soon after his accession, was determined to push for a breakthrough with China and to re-activate the nearly three decades long hiatus in Sino-Vatican relations.  A pre-negotiation joint working group was formed with representatives from Beijing and the Vatican to first thrash out thorny questions before the real negotiations could then take place. The question of the appointment of Chinese bishops was discussed. 

The Sino-Vatican Agreement was officially signed on September 22, 2018 and specified that the government would nominate bishops, and that the Pope would  have power to veto a Chinese nomination.

Xi Jinping has not launched crackdowns on party rule. The 56 national minorities maintain their identity. Mosques have not been destroyed. Local language is accompanied by Mandarin language to ensure that the national minorities engage with the rest of the 1.4 billion population and play their part in boosting economic development over the length and breadth of China.

The tendency for national minorities to marry “in” and not “out” will be countered by encouragement to select a life partner from the community and not only from the same national minority. Some will regard this as modern and others as traditional. Custom change in all societies – consider Jews where the traditional custom of marrying a fellow Jew is undergoing major change.

China is not smothering or suppressing minority languages, religious norms or traditional customs. It is a multi-ethnic state. The majority Han do not oppress the 56 national minorities by denying them their right to celebrate their traditions but they will be encouraged to embrace and participate in an ever-widening life style that increases their opportunity to mix with ease with their fellow Chinese citizens – be they members of other national minorities or members of the Han majority.

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CHINA AND JACK PERRY

In view of the length and importance of the article on China and its National Minorities I have deferred until the next issue of the China Post #617 two intriguing questions;- first, the interest of British Intelligence (MI5 and MI6) in Jack’s links with the British Communist Party. And second, the interest of the same British Intelligence organisations (MI5 and MI6) in Jack’s relations with China.

How did MI5 and MI6 snoop on Jack? Was it limited to tapping his phone? Or were others tapped as well? And with the current flurry of media comment about alleged China spies how did the same UK intelligence services check up on Jack and has it continued to the present day? See #China Post #617 – within the next 7 days.

GRAHAM PERRY